A United States of Europe? Mapping and Designing Constitution-Making for Europe by González Cadenas, Diego
Estudios de Deusto 
© Universidad de Deusto • ISSN 0423-4847 • ISSN-e 2386-9062, Vol. 68/2, julio-diciembre 2020, págs. 141-167
http://www.revista-estudios.deusto.es/ 1411
A UNITED STATES OF EUROPE? MAPPING AND 
DESIGNING CONSTITUTION-MAKING FOR 
EUROPE
¿Unos Estados Unidos de Europa? Mapeando y diseñando 
un proceso constituyente para Europa
Diego Gonzalez Cadenas
Prof. Ayudante Doctor







In recent times, scholars, public intellectuals, political and social movements and 
prominent European political leaders of different ideological orientations have called 
for a United States of Europe. From their point of view, facing the EU legitimacy 
crisis requires a democratic renewal through a constituent process. However, these 
statements have not been accompanied by a specific design on how to institute this 
new European Constitution. To discuss possible ways to operationalize this idea, this 
paper presents the chief formulations of the European constituent power and its trans-
lation into a concrete constitution-making design.
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En los últimos tiempos, académicos, intelectuales públicos, movimientos políti-
cos y sociales y destacados líderes políticos europeos de diferentes orientaciones 
ideológicas han hecho un llamamiento a la creación de unos Estados Unidos de 
Europa. Desde su punto de vista, enfrentar la crisis de legitimidad de la UE requiere 
una renovación democrática a través de un proceso constituyente. Sin embargo, estas 
declaraciones no han sido acompañadas por un diseño específico sobre cómo instituir 
esta nueva Constitución Europea. Con el objeto de discutir las posibles vías de poner 
en práctica esta idea, este artículo presenta las principales formulaciones del poder 
constituyente europeo y su traducción a un diseño concreto de constitution-making.
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ropean pouvoir constituent. 1. EU intergovernmental Treaties-
building: Monnet functionalist method. 2. The pouvoir constituant 
mixte and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 3. The 
classical and democratic concept of pouvoir constituant: A European 
constituent assembly. III. The design of a democratic and partici-
patory european constituent process. 1. Activating the European 
constituent power. 2. Functioning of the European constituent assem-
bly. 3. The referendum for ratifying the constitutional text. IV. Con-
clusions and future research lines. References.
I. INTRODUCTION
“It [is not] possible to ignore the fact that they do tend to undermine the loy-
alty of large segments of the population. How else, indeed, might one explain 
such highly visible developments as the revival of extreme right-wing pop-
ulism, the rampant egotism of most interest groups and the burgeoning of iden-
tity politics and xenophobia.” This statement, which could have well been 
made in any current public media or in any of the many articles and books ded-
icated to the crisis of the European Union and the emergence of populist 
options, was made twenty years ago by Giuseppe Federico Mancini (1998, 39), 
judge of the Court of Justice of the European Communities at the time. Twenty 
years later, the European political situation, far from improving, has worsened 
considerably. Hence, as highlighted by the European Court of Human Rights 
judge, García de Enterría, linked as the latter to Harvard Law School, “once it 
has become widespread until its practical exhaustion the Monnet method of 
partial integrations, far beyond what its own author could have believed, the 
objective would be to adopt the system that two centuries ago was assumed by 
all Western States to form political units able to effectively serve the values of 
freedom, equality and solidarity: the system of a Constitution” (1995, 11).
In this vein, some scholars, public intellectuals and social movements 
have been pointing out in recent times that facing a crisis of these charac-
teristics requires a constituent renewal through a democratic process 
(Patberg 2018). Moreover, prominent European political leaders of dif-
ferent ideological orientations have pointed out its convenience or have 
been doing so for some time. This is the case, for example, of Martin 
Schulz (Oltermann 2017), Guy Verhofstadt (The Spinelli Group 2013; 
Verhofstadt 2006, 71), Yanis Varoufakis1 or, in a less direct way, 
1 See European Spring electoral program for the 2019 European elections, https://
europeanspring.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/EuropeanSpring-Manifesto.ENG_.pdf 
A United States of Europe? Mapping and designing constitution-making for Europe Diego Gonzalez Cadenas
Estudios de Deusto 
© Universidad de Deusto • ISSN 0423-4847 • ISSN-e 2386-9062, Vol. 68/2, julio-diciembre 2020, págs. 141-167
http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ed-68(2)-2020pp141-167 • http://www.revista-estudios.deusto.es/144 4
Emmanuel Macron.2 The political argument is clear: only through a rap-
prochement between political elites and the people and the collaborative 
construction of a common project it is possible to regain the confidence 
of the vast majorities of the EU citizens. The European federal State that 
will result is, according to these authors and political figures, the only 
way to resist the permanent extortion and attacks on governments by 
transnational capital and to enable an alternative to the multiplicity of 
pressing global challenges that we are facing. As Habermas sums it up: 
“the globalization of commerce and communication, of economic pro-
duction and finance, of the spread of technology and weapons, and above 
all of ecological and military risks, poses problems that can no longer be 
solved within the framework of nation-states or by the traditional meth-
ods of agreement between sovereign states” (1998, 106). The Coronavi-
rus outbreak, in this sense, clearly evidence unresolved tensions that may 
accelerate the decomposition of the European integration project if bold 
measures are not taken (Moreno González 2020, 5). As the Governor of 
the Bank of Spain summed it up, “If not now, when?” (Hernández de Cos 
2020).
Legally speaking, there are strong arguments that reinforces this constitu-
tional-building strategy. First of all, if we accept that the Union’s legitimacy 
nucleus emerges from the democratic constitutional States, the integration 
process has proven its inability to cover up the construction of the Union 
together with the social constitutionalism (Moreno González 2019, 2017; 
Maestro Buelga 2017; Monereo Pérez 2014). There is a decoupling between 
the social constitutions of the Members States, legitimized through the exer-
cise of the democratic constituent power, and the European primary law, that 
in spite of being superior to the national laws of Member States has not 
emerged as a direct mandate of the European people. This “clandestine loss 
of powers” (Grimm 2017, 6) and “deconstitutionalization process” (De Cabo 
Martín 2009, 106) of the EU Member States, orchestrated by an intergovern-
mental construction process of the Treaties and consolidated through a pro-
cess of “judicial liberalization” (Scharpf 2017, 319), whose main objective is 
to verify the consistency and subjection of national rules in relation to EU’s 
economic freedoms (Menéndez 2011, 38, 2017; Aguilar Calahorro 2014; 
Hinajeros 2015), enters into direct contradiction with the constitutions of the 
From a close ideological perspective, see (Martelli 2013) and (Negri and Sánchez Cedillo 
2015)
2 Commission des Affaires Européennes, “Groupe de Travail Sur Les Conventiones 
Démocratiques de Refondation de l’Europe,” 2017 (Commission des Affaires Eu-
ropéennes 2017)and Les Consultations citoyennes sur l’Europe, https://www.toute-
leurope.eu/consultations-citoyennes.html (last visited Jan 10, 2019).
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Member States (Grimm 2017, 13) and is based on the European Court of Jus-
tice’s interpretation of an alleged European constituent will that has never 
been expressed. All this, added to the lack of a unified labor and fiscal policy 
(F. Fabbrini 2014; Von Rompuy 2012), diminishes the possibilities of dem-
ocratic action by hindering the creation of an alternative citizens’ will. This, 
on the one hand, favors the ability of European capital to act since it has sub-
jective rights recognized that can be asserted before the European Court of 
Justice against possible Keynesian economic policies and regulatory devel-
opments regarding the protection of social and labor rights (Bugaric 2013; 
Poiares Maduro 1998). On the other hand, correlatively, the possibilities of 
democratic institutions to tame the European “savage powers” (Ferrajoli 
2011), diminish.
The authors and politicians that defend the idea of federalizing Europe are 
well aware of the wide range of economic, social, cultural, geopolitical, politi-
cal and legal difficulties that makes their project a very complex political 
undertaking. However, as stressed by Streeck (2017, 2016), they consider that 
what is completely unrealistic is that the EU will last much longer if the present 
status quo is maintained. They reckon that the controlled dismantling of Euro-
pean welfare systems is fostering a radicalization of political positions in 
which the European Union is perceived as one of the main culprits. In their 
view, the division between creditor and debtor States caused by the conversion 
of private debt into public debt, and the social and fiscal dumping problems due 
to the lack of unified labor and fiscal legislation, with the correlative weaken-
ing of the institutions’ capacity for action and the strengthening of the power of 
the European big capital (Fossum and Menéndez 2012, 22), generates, espe-
cially in the central countries of the Union, a growing rise of exclusionary 
nationalist positions that pillory the European integration process.
To put it bluntly, from the federalists perspective, the Union is facing a 
quandary between the continuity of an elitist model that is the breeding 
ground for the rise of Eurosceptic populism, the return to the framework of 
political action in the Nation-State raised by some left (Lapavitsas 2017) and 
right-wing (Hooghe 2007) theorists [which, in a context of inability from the 
state framework to face the complex dynamics and problems of global capi-
tal, would arouse the tensions between the European states so characteristic 
of the continent’s history (Eriksen and Fossum 2012)] and the deepening in 
a democratic and constitutional style of the integration process. Clement 
Attlee summed up this point of view when he stated, in 1939, that “Europe 
must federate or perish”3. Brexit is, from this point of view, a serious warning 
3 Regarding the rich and intense debate in the British Parliament about the possibility 
of a European integration in a federal style during the 40s in the last century, see Haapala 
and Häkkinen (2017).
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about the possibilities of reversion and irreversibility of the integration pro-
ject. Nevertheless, the federalists perceive that this major crisis of legitimacy 
leaves the door open to a deep reconstruction and widening of the democratic 
constitutional project, crystallized in the constitutions following the Second 
World War. In this sense, only the expansion of a supranational civic solidar-
ity through a democratic deepening of the project of European integration 
could stop the divergence and the conflict between peoples that generates 
exclusive nationalism (Habermas 2015, 549; Ferrajoli 2019, 99).
The idea of having a constituent moment to proceed with the construction 
of a European federal State is by no means a novel idea in legal doctrine nor 
in European political and philosophical thought. On the contrary, this idea is 
present, at least, from the 17th Century and has been defended by thinkers as 
William Penn, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Immanuel Kant, Víctor Hugo or 
José Ortega y Gasset (Renouvin 1949). At the time of the Aftermath of 
World War II, with the first debates about European integration, the strategic 
division was not about the construction of a European federal State, but on 
the ways to achieve that objective. While radical federalists encouraged its 
quick creation, functionalist federalists, like Jean Monnet, advocated a grad-
ual conversion to a federal State, the “small steps” approach, conforming first 
a European common identity and granting the cohesion of the European peo-
ples through the articulation of common interests. The failure of the federal-
ist European Political Community in 1954 paved the way for the functionalist 
strategy until today (Viciano Pastor 2001, 91; Griffiths 2000).
Some authors, noting that Monnet functionalist method is exhausted, 
point out the need to initiate a process to deeply reform the Treaties so as to 
delve into the process of European integration with the aim of improving the 
institutional architecture of the Union and solving their democratic deficien-
cies (García Roca and Martínez Lago 2014; Monereo Pérez 2014; Porras 
Ramírez 2014; Pérez de las Heras 2010). Other scholars, with the objective 
of laying the foundations of a European federal structure, indicate some of 
the key aspects and principles that, in their opinion, should guide an eventual 
reform or constituent process (Marti 2008; S. Fabbrini 2015b; Ferrajoli 2019, 
96). Nevertheless, to my knowledge, no concrete proposal for an eventual 
European constituent process design has been suggested from the academy, 
which is striking after all the development of the constitution-making theory 
of the last two decades (Tushnet 2013; Blount, Elkins, and Ginsburg 2012; 
Elster 2012; Eisenstadt, Levan, and Maboudi 2017; Arato 2017; Böcken-
förde, Hedling, and Wahiu 2011; Brandt et al. 2011; Braver 2017; Banks 
2008; Colón-Ríos 2011; Hart 2003; Landau 2013; Saunders 2012). Accord-
ingly, the public and academic debate should be encouraged by setting out 
concrete political and legal ways that formalize these statements. To do so, 
this paper begins presenting the chief formulations of the European 
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constituent power and its translation into a concrete constitution-making 
design. I uphold, in a second part, that the classical concept of pouvoir con-
stituant is the most consistent with a democratic theory of the Constitution 
and I suggest that the European constituent power should be activated 
through a similar mechanism that the one lay down in the article V of the US 
Constitution and express itself without the constraints of the national consti-
tutional systems, in a constituent assembly exclusively composed by directly 
elected members. Moreover, I maintain that this process should be guided by 
the principles of participation, transparency and inclusivity. By doing so, I 
try to answer the questions raised by Patberg (2017, 210) regarding the con-
nections between the constitutions of the Member States, the new European 
constitutional text, and the form the activation of constituent power should be 
adopted at the European level.
II.  DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN POUVOIR 
CONSTITUENT
The key question that needs a theoretical response in order to operation-
alize the design of a constituent process in the EU, is about the autonomy or 
heteronomy of EU law. If it is deemed autonomous, the citizens of the Union 
constitute the European constituent power. On the contrary, if it is defended 
that it is heteronomous, the Member States are the subjects of the European 
constituent power (Möellers 2010, 185). Hence, we have three possibilities 
of understanding the European constituent power depending on where we 
locate the subject of the constituent power. First, we will see the two possi-
bilities that have being exercised in practice: the intergovernmental concep-
tion of the European constituent power, that has been put on practice since 
the beginning of the integration process; and the habermasian conception of 
pouvoir constituant mixte, that we can partially illustrate with the Conven-
tion for the Future of Europe in 2003-2004, whose purpose was to draft a 
Constitution for the EU. The first of these possibilities, as I will show, is 
clearly exhausted. As for the second one, as is widely known, it has been a 
failure. Therefore, if we accept that the EU needs a constitutional and demo-
cratic renewal, there is only one way left for activating the constituent power 
in the EU, putting in its center not the States but the citizens.
1. EU intergovernmental Treaties-building: Monnet functionalist method
Usually, scholars depict a Constitution as the set of fundamental norms that 
characterize any legal order: the regulation of the organization of the State and 
the exercise of state power, the conformation of the bodies that exercise State 
power, the regulation of the relations between State and citizens and the values 
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and principles that inform the entire legal system. From this point of view, every 
State necessarily has its own constitution, regardless of whether it is a more or 
less liberal text or its form of elaboration is more or less democratic (Guastini 
2001, 2009). In this vein, most of EU law scholars assume that EU primary law 
is a constitution as it is an autonomous legal order that has primacy over the 
national law, is directly applicable, has a charter of fundamental rights that sets 
out all the rights enjoyed by EU citizens, and creates and regulates a series of 
institutions (Weiler 1991; Craig 2011; Scarlatti 2010). This conception of the 
EU Constitution implies a constituent power that situates at its core the Member 
States. As Patberg sums it up, “constituent power simply becomes a synonym 
for the treaty-making competence of sovereign nation-states” (2018, 265). 
Hence, it is common to portray the Member States as the “masters of the trea-
ties”, as coined by the German Constitutional Court in its Maastricht ruling of 
October 12 1993, or to depict the European Council, the EU institution that is 
formed by of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, as the 
“constitutional architect” of the EU (Wessels 2016, 104). With regard to the par-
ticipation of European citizens, even if it takes place a posteriori, on faits 
accomplis, and is always mediated by the internal regulation of the Member 
States, as EU citizens have in some occasions directly participated in the ratifi-
cation of the Treaties and always indirectly by requiring the approval of national 
parliaments, the majority of the doctrine considers that it is possible to speak of 
a European constituent power configured in such a way (Preuß 2011).
In addition, EU so-called constitutionalisation was consolidated by 
another key actor authorized by the Member States, the Court of Justice 
(Marti 2013, 316; Mancini 1989). Two decisions of the Court from 1963 
(Van Gent en Loos) and 1964 (Costa v. ENEL) enshrined the principles of 
primacy and direct applicability of the community law. From there, the con-
struction of EU constitutional edifice has been deeply intertwined with the 
legitimizing role of the Court. This have been like that to the extent that the 
Court stated in 1986 (Les Verts v. European Parliament) that “‘the European 
Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as 
neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the ques-
tion whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty”. Since then, the majority of EU law doc-
trine assume the equivalence between the Treaties as an EU Constitution.
In recent years, this form of intergovernmental integration has deepened in 
the wake of the economic crisis and the progressive configuration of the new 
European economic governance. Some commentators note that this process 
has sharpened the process of the de-democratization of the Union. Under the 
umbrella of permanent economic emergency, the intergovernmental pillar of 
the Union has been significantly strengthened (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016; S. 
Fabbrini 2013, 2015a), with the European Council playing a central role 
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(Carammia, Princen, and Timmermans 2016; Puetter 2012; Wessels 2012). 
That is why the EU decision-making process has been described as “executive 
federalism” (Habermas 2012, 337), “authoritarian managerialism” (Joerges 
2015, 218) or “executive dominance” (Curtin 2014). This predominance of the 
European Council has fostered the development of a procedural strategy that 
allows the governments of the Member States, on the one hand, to circumvent 
the controls and the possible opposition of the national and European repre-
sentative institutions, and, on the other hand, escape the formal and material 
requirements of the EU law. The same governments that approve the imple-
mentation of policies in the European Council that are difficult to justify inter-
nally, utilize the EU as a scapegoat for the development of such policies.
Furthermore, the management of the economic crisis has resulted in the deep 
transformation of the economic constitution of the Union without proceeding to 
the corresponding Treaties reforms. According to the Treaties, the fundamental 
objective of the EMU is price stability. Nonetheless, the new economic govern-
ance measures have added financial and budgetary stability with the same rank 
of importance and have altered the distribution of competences. On the other 
hand, the adoption of international treaties outside European Union Law, the Fis-
cal Compact and the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
(Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016; Bocquillon and Dobbels 2014), makes it increas-
ingly difficult to speak of the European Union as a Union (Dawson 2015; Linde 
Paniagua 2012). As highlighted by Fabbrini, “the Lisbon Treaty has institution-
alized a dual constitution with related decision-making regimes (supranational 
regarding the policies of the single market and intergovernmental regarding inter 
alia economic and financial policies)” (2013, 1005).
All this has occurred without a public debate process and the direct acqui-
escence of the European citizens to endorse a constitutional text configured 
in such a way. It is therefore necessary to consider to what extent the integra-
tion process should continue to be built on intergovernmental and techno-
cratic acts (Habermas 2015; Sánchez-Cuenca 2017; Scicluna 2015; 
Schimmelfennig 2015) without the direct acquiescence of the European peo-
ples, thus producing an appropriation on the part of the institutions of the 
Union of the European constituent power. This explosive cocktail is directly 
related with the growth of far-right Eurosceptic political forces and Brexit 
(Walker 2016), demonstrating, therefore, that the intergovernmental method 
of integration has been exhausted.
2.  The pouvoir constituant mixte and the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe
According to Habermas (2017, 2015), both answers are valid to solve the 
quandary that we initially posed: EU law may be deemed autonomous and 
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heterogenous. Following his point of view, which illustrates through a hypo-
thetical and past European constituent assembly, the integration process is 
the result of a pouvoir constituant mixte, an expression of popular sover-
eignty shared among European citizens as a whole and citizens in their 
capacity as citizens of Member States.4 This approach allows Habermas to 
square the ideological assumptions he is based on: the maintenance of posi-
tivized achievements in the constitutions of the social State and a political, 
social, economic and fiscal unification process in such a way to establish a 
transnational democracy that is not organized as a federal state.
The alteration made by Habermas of the pure constituent power theory is 
built as a circular fallacy to justify a previous ideological position. But, in 
addition, the presumption that the outcome of the process must necessarily be 
linked to the past constituent power whose will was reflected in the constitu-
tions of the Member States implies cutting off the disruptive potential of the 
constituent power, depriving it of its eminently sovereign nature, and conse-
quently, taking any democratic content out of the concept. That reliance on 
the past that Habermas contemplates, as Niesen (2017, 190) points out, can-
not be argued to stop the constituent power’s freedom to reinvent itself. Fur-
thermore, avoiding any connection of the constituent assembly’s work with 
the constitutions of the Member States would enliven the debate’s politiciza-
tion, the conflict would be made explicit and the creation of a public sphere 
of debate at European level would be encouraged.
One may also ask, in accordance with the idea of connecting the future 
text to the constitutions of the Member States, how to proceed in order to 
scrutinize that the resulting text does not contradict them. Should the CJEU 
undertake material control of the Constitution, as did, for example, the South 
African Constitutional Court in 1996? According to the CJEU’s judgment 
established in the Pringle case (para. 30 et seq.), the Court has no compe-
tence to control an ordinary reform of the Treaties as this are acts adopted by 
a Convention or an Intergovernmental Conference. In this sense, Habermas’ 
approach reaffirms a distrust in popular will, as it defends that a court could 
restrict it. Ratifying the Constitution is a task that must correspond exclu-
sively to citizens. A body whose legitimacy derives from the citizenry cannot 
overcome its will.
Marti (2008, 621) has developed the general guidelines of the eventual 
design of a constituent process, based on similar assumptions to those of 
Habermas. From her point of view, an eventual constituent convention must 
be composed of the two sources of legitimacy of the future European federa-
tion, the peoples and the States. In this way, the seats in the convention must 
4 This idea of “double legitimacy” or of “dual constituent subject” is already found in 
García de Enterría (1995, 21) and De Carreras Serra (1995, 206).
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be held by deputies of national parliaments or members of governments and 
representatives directly elected by citizens. Similarly, she also states that 
European Union institutions must also be involved, in order to provide a 
more practical and technical perspective. In her opinion, the distribution of 
seats among the government or parliament representatives and those directly 
elected must be egalitarian, while the representatives of the European institu-
tions should have a lower number of votes.
Marti’s proposal of an EU constituent-process design differs with the pro-
cess that culminated in 2005 with the rejection of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe in that the constitutional convention should have the 
last word and no intergovernmental conference with the power to modify the 
text resulting from the convention should play any role. This aspect of the 
constitution-making design corresponds with the theory of constituent power 
and people’s sovereignty, as understood in the US from the first constitu-
tion-making processes in the revolutionary moment (Fritz 2008). However, 
from this point of view, it is not possible to defend that, in the style of the 
European Convention of 2002-2003, representatives of the European Parlia-
ment and national parliaments, governments, the Committee of the Regions 
and the Economic and Social Committee should hold a position (Porras 
Ramírez 2014, 218), or that only some of the members of the constituent 
assembly should be directly elected (Marti 2008, 621). In this sense, without 
even realizing it, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was absolutely right when he 
described the works of the 2002-2003 European Convention as “our Phila-
delphia” (Scicluna 2015, 54). The metaphor applies. Indeed, the Constitution 
of the United States was the result of a non-democratic and opaque process, 
which today the citizens of consolidated democracies would deem to be 
hardly acceptable (Tushnet 2013, 1994). The indirect election of the 55 del-
egates nominated by the legislatures of the different States, the granting of 
the same vote weight to each State regardless of their size, or the impossibil-
ity of knowing the content of the deliberations [in spite of the suffocating 
heat in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, the windows of the Independ-
ence Hall were kept closed so that nobody could see or hear what was being 
discussed (Lepore 2018, xi)] are elements that certainly remind us of certain 
phases of the failed European process.
In essence, three design errors can be highlighted in the process. Firstly, 
the members of the Convention on the Future of Europe were indirectly 
elected, drawing out the logic of the Philadelphia Convention, the 1945 
Indian Constituent Assembly, where most of the constituents were elected by 
provincial assemblies, or the Bonn’s Parlamentarischer Rat that drafted and 
passed the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, where the con-
stituents were elected by the legislative bodies of the States. Dividing them 
into two categories necessarily entails the indirect election of State 
A United States of Europe? Mapping and designing constitution-making for Europe Diego Gonzalez Cadenas
Estudios de Deusto 
© Universidad de Deusto • ISSN 0423-4847 • ISSN-e 2386-9062, Vol. 68/2, julio-diciembre 2020, págs. 141-167
http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ed-68(2)-2020pp141-167 • http://www.revista-estudios.deusto.es/152 12
representatives who have not been directly elected for that task. Indeed, the 
indirect election of representatives is, along with other mechanisms such as 
the bicameral system or the restricted suffrage, one of the aristocratic mech-
anisms that moderate the eventual democratic excesses unwanted by the 
political and economic elites (Elster 1997, 130). Secondly, the Intergovern-
mental Conference, which followed the Convention’s works, was entitled to 
modify and adopt the text approved by the latter. As a result, the Convention 
developed its work considering its subsequent acceptance by governments, 
rather than by citizens. Last but not least, although it was stressed that the 
process had been opened to the participation of civil society, most of the 
NGOs that participated in the process were directly financed by European 
Union institutions or projects (Scicluna 2015, 54). What is more, despite the 
constituent rhetoric, it was a process that ended up being hardly transparent 
given its intergovernmentalization.
In sum, the works of the Convention were not the result of a constituent 
moment and a broad debate throughout the continent, and neither did it com-
ply with the formal requirements for the activation of the constituent power, 
that is, the election of a constituent assembly composed only by representa-
tives directly elected and, therefore, established to represent the European 
constituent power (Viciano Pastor 2001). The rejection of the Treaty estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe by French and Dutch citizens in 2005 
showed that this elitist and barely democratic way of operating has great dif-
ficulties to prosper and it is not a suitable way to solve the existing problems 
of crisis of democratic legitimacy.
3.  The classical and democratic concept of pouvoir constituant: A 
European constituent assembly
As I have shown, the two ways of understanding the constituent power in 
the EU that have been put into practice, clearly elitist and scarcely demo-
cratic, does not work. Accepting that the EU needs a constitutional renewal, 
the only way left is the one that situates citizens as the only protagonists of 
the EU constituent power. According to the classical and democratic concep-
tion of the constituent power, it can be defined as the power that in a given 
moment has the legitimacy to establish a new constitution. It is characterized 
by being: 1) an original power, not depending on any previous power; 2) an 
initial power since its impulse depends solely on it; 3) a founding power as it 
implies a break with the previous legal-political order; 4) an unconditioned, 
unlimited, sovereign power and, consequently, prejudicial; 5) only based on 
democratic legitimacy (De Cabo Martín 2003, 31). It can only be spoken, in 
purity, of Constitution, when it emanates from the constituent power, that is, 
when it has been adopted through direct expression of popular sovereignty, 
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verifying the adequacy between popular will and constitutional text. Other-
wise, it could be considered as a Basic Law, as in the German case, but it 
would not be correct to use the term Constitution. The identification between 
the concept of Constitution and the direct participation of the citizens is at the 
very roots of the idea of Constitution since the Constitution of Massachusetts 
was widely debated and subsequently ratified in the towns and cities of Mas-
sachusetts in 1780 (Handlin and Handlin 1966).
The practical implications of this conceptualization are crucial. As is not 
possible to describe the Treaties as a Constitution insofar as they are not the 
consequence of a constituent act (Díez-Picazo Giménez 1993), inasmuch as 
only through the intervention of the constituent power it is possible to create 
a political union (Jimena Quesada and Tajadura Tejada 2015; Patberg 
2016),5 and accepting that this is the only way left to develop a constituent 
process in a democratic way, the design of the process requires exercising the 
people’s constituent power through an ad hoc constituent body and introduc-
ing participatory mechanisms in order to guarantee that the Constitution is 
the reflect of the people’s will and not of the political elites. Therewith, it is 
possible to fulfill the foundational requirement of the idea of Constitution, 
and therefore the most important one: The Constitution as a legal-political 
framework established by citizens to limit the exercise of political power. 
The fundamental idea of the Constitution is not, although it seems at first 
sight, its legal effectiveness or its supreme position in the legal system that it 
originates. This has also been achieved by the self-proclaimed constitutions 
that conceal authoritarian regimes and that have been elaborated by the polit-
ical power itself to mask its position of domination. That can also be achieved 
by a community treaty or any treaty that establishes an international organi-
zation. But in these two cases there is no direct limitation by citizens of polit-
ical power (Viciano Pastor 2001, 98). In this sense, in the second part of this 
article, I develop, following the work of some constitution-making scholars, 
a constituent process design for the EU in accordance with the classical and 
democratic constituent power theory.
III. THE DESIGN OF A DEMOCRATIC AND PARTICIPATORY 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUENT PROCESS
From a political point of view, although the United Kingdom’s departure 
from the Union can be analyzed as an opportunity to deepen the integration 
5 In this sense, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, in its judgment on the compatibility of 
the Treaty of Lisbon with the Bonn Basic Law, determined that, if we went further into the 
integration path towards the construction of a European federal State, the German constit-
uent power should express itself directly.
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process, its traditional Nordic partners and other Member States with clearly 
Eurosceptic governments are a political hindrance that hampers or prevents, 
for now, thinking about an eventual constituent process that can count on the 
approval of all governments and peoples of the Union.6 Even if, a priori, 
some governments might be inclined to favor the eventual opening of a con-
stituent process that culminates in the founding of a European federal state, 
they could end up seeking to stop such integration due to a dilution in their 
sovereignty and leading role in the federation. Therefore, the first problem to 
face, when solving the possibilities of an eventual opening of a European 
constituent process, is to determine whether all Member States of the Union 
can or should federate, or, on the contrary, whether the federating path 
should be left open only to those Member States that wish to do so. It is clear 
that, given the internal correlation of political forces in many of the Member 
States, transforming the EU into a federation is currently impossible. In this 
sense, at least for the time being, there is no point in continuing to explore 
this possibility and it must be only considered the option of federating a 
smaller number of Member States. Hence, assuming that the future federa-
tion, if it were to exist, will be composed only of some of the Member States 
and not by all, different potential mechanisms can be considered for activat-
ing the European constituent power according to a democratic theorization of 
the constituent power.
1. Activating the European constituent power
Let us see which particular paths could be chosen to activate in Europe 
the constituent power according to its classic and democratic theorization. I 
discard analyzing here the political options that can be proposed to proceed 
to an original activation of the European constituent power. There is a broad 
range of forms of social and political pressure that could be activated: col-
lecting signatures through the European citizens’ initiative,7 a Spitzenkandi-
6 A recent survey questioning the citizens of six Member States about the potential 
creation of a European federal state points out the differences of opinion between the 
German and French citizens, mostly favorable or without an opinion in this regard, and 
those of the Nordic states (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway), mostly unfavorable.
7 This path is not exempt of legal and political problems. It is not possible, according 
to the present regulation, to request the Commission to carry out a referendum at the Un-
ion level since no referendum mechanism is foreseen in the Treaties. Moreover, according 
to the Commission, is not viable to reform the Treaties by means of a European citizens’ 
initiative. Hence, the registration of some initiatives, such as the one which sought the 
introduction of a referendum mechanism at the European level, have been denied (Fernán-
dez Le Gal 2018, 19; Vázquez Rodríguez 2017, 165). Even if we accept that is legally 
possible to going down this path, as the Committee of the Regions and various members 
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daten reaching the presidency of the Commission having as central point in 
its program the call for a consultation at European level about the opening of 
a constituent process, or as proposed by Jimena Quesada and Tajadura 
Tejada (2015, 50), noting that it would imply a breach of current legislation, 
the European Parliament’s call for a constituent opening referendum.
My objective here is to propose two specific alternatives according to 
which the States would commit themselves to establish a mechanism that 
allows the opening of a constituent process. First, this commitment can be 
formalized through the ordinary reform procedure established in Article 48 
TEU. A review of the reform procedure itself can be considered as a result of 
the momentum of the Government of any Member State, the European Par-
liament or the Commission. To facilitate procedures, significantly shorten 
the time to adopt the reform and avoid the need for different institutions to 
reach agreements, it is appropriate, in accordance with the possibility estab-
lished in the Treaty, not to proceed with the call for a convention. The reform 
of the reform procedure is not a minor issue at all. However, it is not intended 
to avoid the future call for a convention or for a constituent assembly that 
requires broad agreements among different political positions, but, on the 
contrary, to contribute to make it happen. The possible need to reform Article 
52 TEU due to the Brexit may even be exploited to proceed with such reform 
(F. Fabbrini 2017).
Secondly, in line with the procedures for adopting the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, and in a similar vein 
to the legal proposal of Jean-Claude Piris (2012, 121) for achieving a two-
speed Europe, an international treaty outside European Union Law could be 
signed among the Member States that wish to do so. The advantage of this 
procedure over that of the ordinary reform of Treaties is that it allows to 
introduce the mechanism without the need for the approval of all the Member 
States and, therefore, to circumvent the requirement of unanimity. Likewise, 
in line with the TSCG, it allows European institutions, notably the CJEU, to 
play a surveillance role of what is agreed. On the contrary, carrying out a pro-
cedure of this kind outside European Union Law, regardless of any eventual 
litigation that might arise in the CJEU, leaves the door closed for the citizens 
of the States that do not sign the Treaty to request, through the mechanism of 
of the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Petitions sustained in the debates about the new European 
citizens’ initiative regulation, the Commission is not compelled to sponsor a legal act in 
response to a citizens’ initiative. This implies that, even if the Commission allows the 
registration of an initiative whose purpose is the aforementioned purposes, depending on 
its political correlation of forces, it may not prosper.
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citizen initiative that will be explained below, the participation of their State 
in the constituent assembly. In this sense, it might be convenient to first try to 
sound out the first option, and if it does not work out, to opt for this path.
In either case, I believe that a mechanism should be generated, which 
would be added to Article 48 TEU or that would give content to the new 
international treaty, according to which, in a similar manner of the Article V 
of the Constitution of the United States, a constituent assembly should con-
vene if half of the Member States approve the opening of a constituent pro-
cess through an internal referendum. As in the US, it would be not necessary 
for the States to approve it at the same time and each State could withdraw its 
proposal whenever it wishes to do so. It would also be appropriate that the 
Member States introduce into their constitutions a mechanism according to 
which citizens would also have the possibility of activating the referendum to 
launch the process. This commitment to introduce a European constituent 
initiative clause could be part of the agreement that will be adopted within 
the European Council at the time of reforming the TEU. Or, it could be estab-
lished at the new international treaty in the same way as it was done in the 
TSCG, according to which the signatory States committed themselves, 
within a period not exceeding one year after the entry into force of the treaty, 
to introduce the golden rule in its domestic legal system, preferably in its 
Constitution, an introduction whose compliance could be controlled by the 
CJEU.
Hence, I partially agree with Fabbrini (2015b, 278) when he propounds 
that the European Constitution should be drawn up by a convention preceded 
by a pre-constitutional agreement signed by the elites of the countries that 
commit themselves to participate in the project to define the objectives of the 
Constitution and the procedure to approve it. Indeed, in accordance with the 
two proposed paths, a commitment must be made by the elites of the Member 
States to reform the TEU or to sign an international treaty. Nevertheless, the 
commitment to participate in an eventual constituent process cannot be a 
consequence of the will of elites, but of that of citizens. In this way, a real 
conformity would be guaranteed and the contours of the European constitu-
ent power would be delimited.
2. Functioning of the European constituent assembly
According to Rodrik (2018, 77), we could be facing the last opportunity 
to drive an alternative project for European integration. The enthusiasm for 
the European project could only be sharpen through a broad democratic 
deliberation, breaking the remoteness or perception of distance, of a signifi-
cant part of European citizens regarding the project and the European institu-
tions. Therefore, one of the main elements of the process must be the 
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broadness of democratic participation mechanisms and their transparency. 
As expressed by Moëllers: “A real constitution […] should not be the result 
of an intergovernmental pork barrel compromise but a genuine deliberative 
procedure: Habermasian virtues instead of intergovernamental vice” (2010, 
201).
The debate on citizen participation in constituent processes has captured 
much of the attention of researchers specializing in constitution-making 
(González Cadenas 2018, 187). Among the virtues attributed to it, it is worth 
noting, first, the increase in the legitimacy of the origin of the future Constitu-
tion (Martínez Dalmau 2014) and the political system (Eisenstadt, Levan, and 
Maboudi 2017), which in turn leads to an increased longevity (Elkins, Gins-
burg, and Melton 2009, 207) of the former and stability of the latter. Likewise, 
it is emphasized that citizens’ control and pressure prevent, on the one hand, 
the adoption of provisions that delimit democratic rights and freedoms (Voigt 
2003; Samuels 2006) and, on the other hand, encourage the introduction of reg-
ulations that guarantee them together with precepts and innovative mecha-
nisms that go beyond the political agenda of the ruling elites and traditional 
constitutional solutions (Ghai and Galli, 2006; Hart, 2010, p. 41; Aparicio Wil-
helmi, 2011, p. 9; Viciano Pastor and Martínez Dalmau, 2011, p. 23). The par-
ticipatory dynamic itself promotes becoming familiar with the Constitution 
and makes it easier for citizens to make a tool of it to defend and exercise their 
rights (Haysom 2003; Widner 2008, 1519). Equally, citizen participation 
encourages the inclusion of new players, movements and social organizations 
in public life beyond political parties, generating a greater level of pluralism 
(Landau 2013) that, in turn, favors dialog and the achievement of agreements 
that can contribute to closing past wounds, resolving conflicts and reducing the 
gap between different social sectors (Benomar 2004, 88; Samuels 2006, 4).
The other side of the coin of participatory processes is transparency. A 
participatory process cannot perform correctly if the level of transparency is 
not sufficiently high. On the one hand, it limits the role of powerful lobbyists 
behind the scenes by allowing citizens to know what they are proposing. On 
the other hand, it allows citizens to control, restrain and propose alternatives 
(Colón-Ríos 2011). Likewise, transparency in the process entails a greater 
connection of constituents with popular feeling (Elster 1998, 111).
In this vein, the procedure for drafting the constitutional draft that was 
carried out in the Constitutional Council of Iceland in 2011 is very illustra-
tive (Landemore 2015; González Cadenas 2015). In an innovative way, the 
draft constitution was drafted progressively, making public progress period-
ically and allowing citizens to better control developments in the process and 
interact more directly with their representatives. Similarly, the periodic pub-
lication of the draft in the media, which was set weekly in Iceland, entailed a 
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greater social debate, interest in the process, and a better knowledge of the 
constitution.
3. The referendum for ratifying the constitutional text
From the classical and democratic constituent power prism, the conveni-
ence of a constitutional referendum is undisputed as a Constitution must be 
the reflection of the popular will. Hence, the constitution-making process 
cannot remain framed within the game of political elites and citizens must 
necessarily have the last word (Colón-Ríos 2011, 35). Moreover, constitu-
tional referendums are an instrument that prevents constituted powers from 
adopting certain precepts contrary to popular will or that do not coincide with 
the promises made in the electoral campaign (Contreras Casado 2017, 70; 
García-Escudero Márquez 2008, 190). They have the virtue, to put it another 
way, to encourage constituents to seek common positions and introduce pre-
cepts close to the popular feeling (Ghai 2006, 37; Blount, Elkins, and Gins-
burg 2012, 218). While it is true that some constitutions that have not been 
approved in a referendum, such as the Japanese and German constitutions, 
have been highly legitimate, the fact that citizens have the final say on the 
text favors its legitimacy and, therefore, an increased sense of belonging, the 
so-called constitutional feeling (Loewenstein 1986, 200).
Citizens who make up the European constituent power will be those who, 
without renouncing their national constituent power during the process, 
agree to limit it in the referendum to ratify the new constitutional text. From 
this point of view, the referendum should be held at the level of all the partic-
ipating States and approved by an absolute majority of the votes. States that 
do not ratify the text will be excluded from the future federation, provided 
that it is formed with the approval of a clear majority of the States participat-
ing in the constituent assembly.
On the other hand, although the final decision on the text to be submitted to 
referendum should fall on the representatives (not even a large number of peti-
tioners can decide for all citizens), it seems convenient to design a popular initi-
ative mechanism to allow a percentage of representatives and citizens who gather 
enough support to submit a proposal for consideration to their fellow citizens at 
the referendum for ratifying the constitution. This mechanism allows certain 
issues that are considered to be of utmost importance by citizens to be part of the 
social debate, instructing citizens in the matter. Furthermore, unlike the referen-
dums for constitutional ratification that have occurred in almost all cases since 
the French referendum of 1793, citizens should be allowed to decide on separate 
issues instead of being forced to voting on bloc the constitutional text.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH LINES
Some legal, political and economic problems indicate the quandary and the 
deep legitimacy crisis that the EU is facing: the exhaustion of the Monnet func-
tionalist method, the EU legitimacy crisis, the nation-states inability to confront 
globalization, the contradiction between the social constitutions of the Member 
States and the EU primary law, the CJEU’s control of conventionality without its 
interpretative functions being enshrined in constituent debates and the priority of 
the EU’s economic freedoms over the constitutional social rights that diminishes 
the possibilities of democratic action. So as to solve these challenges, some 
scholars, social movements and leading political figures have proposed to initiate 
a democratic constituent process in the EU. If the constituent strategy is part of 
the solution to the highlighted problems, the key question to solve is how the 
European constituent power should be configured. Here there are three answers 
depending on where we locate the subject of the European constituent power, in 
the Member States or in its citizens. In spite of the laudable attempts to reconfig-
ure the classical theory of the constituent power, e.g. the habermasian pouvoir 
constituant mixte, from a democratic perspective the constituent power should 
only rest in the shoulders of the citizens. Moreover, as I have shown, theories that 
locate the European constituent power totally or partially in the Member States, 
do not work or have not worked in practice.
At this point, the scholar debate should focus on proposing and debating a 
concrete design of an eventual constituent process in the EU so as to give a 
technical response to the pretension of some of the most prominent European 
political figures and to clearly depict what the path to a United States of Europe 
would be like. I have done this task taking as reference some works of scholars 
specializing in constitution-making. First, I envisaged the particular legal paths 
that could be chosen to activate in Europe the constituent power according to 
its classic and democratic theorization, an ordinary reform of the article 48 
TEU or the signature of an international treaty outside EU law. In either case, 
the content of such a reform or international treaty may be a mechanism, that 
could be similar to the article V of the US Constitution, that facilitates Member 
States’ citizens convening a constituent assembly. The guidelines of such a 
process should be, according to the classical and democratic theory of the con-
stituent power, the principles of participation, transparency and inclusiveness. 
That means that direct participatory mechanisms should be created and that a 
constitutional referendum is mandatory. Moreover, an important part of consti-
tution-making studies indicate that the future political and constitutional sys-
tem will be more stable as it will be perceived as more legitimate.
In this study, I have merely raised an approach to many of the problems that 
will have to be addressed in order to proceed with the opening and design of a 
European constituent process. There is still some of unresolved or undeveloped 
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issues that require future studies. Substantially, a satisfactory response must be 
found to the relationship between the new Federal State and the European 
Union so as to determine whether the principle of the primacy of European 
Union Law continues to be observed or to what extent. As a way of solving 
these legal conflicts, Martin Schulz or the members of the Spinelli Group indi-
cate that Member States that do not accept the result of the constituent conven-
tion should be automatically excluded from the Union, becoming a sort of EU 
associated states. Nevertheless, this option would not be possible given that, in 
accordance with Article 50 TEU provisions, there is no possibility of expelling 
a Member State. In any case, it could be suggested that the States that consti-
tute the new federal State should leave the EU and proceed to the signing of a 
Treaty with the European Union to define their relations.
Another central issue to be solved is the configuration of the electoral system 
that will regulate the constituent assembly elections. The doctrine specializing in 
constitution-making agrees almost unanimously that the electoral formula must 
generate proportional effects in order to be able to accommodate a plurality of 
political sensitivities and guarantee the presence of minorities (Landau 2013, 
962; Viciano Pastor 2012, 144; Böckenförde, Hedling, and Wahiu 2011, 191; 
Elster 1995, 367). In this vein, the electoral system should be unique and trans-
national lists must be set up. Likewise, I have not made reference to a whole 
series of detail issues that should be covered in a constituent process. Consider, 
for example, the debate about the specific design of mechanisms for citizen par-
ticipation, the linking of citizen proposals to the work of representatives of the 
constituent body, the role of the media, the introduction of gender quotas, the 
majority required for the approval of the text by the constituent body, the quorum 
required to ratify the text or the transition system once the constitution enters into 
force. All these issues, of course, must be decided freely and without constraints 
by the constituent body (Patberg 2018, 268).
Nevertheless, scholars should contribute by generating theoretical analy-
sis and providing empirical evidence on these crucial issues for the future of 
Europe. The role of the academia here is to offer and debate proposals in a 
scientific and critic way. As one of the fathers of the European integration 
process, Altiero Spinelli, argued in May 1982 at the Università di Padova: 
“until now, we could reflect and describe things. From now onwards, action, 
always adventurous and risky, must take the place of meditation”. It should 
be a scientific duty to move from an analytical-deconstructive phrase to a 
proactive-constructive one (Chalmers, Jachtenfuchs, and Joerges 2016, 16). 
Additionally, it should be the goal of academia to contribute to reduce the 
gap between academic studies and core political issues, which in the case of 
the EU is way too big (Scicluna 2015, 2).
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